This paper is about perceptual demonstratives, terms like 'this' and 'that' used to refer to a currently perceived object. How is it that you know what such a term refers to? The natural answer is that your perceptual awareness of the object is a relation to it that provides you with knowledge of what the term stands for.
In the case of a classical propositional constant, such as 'or', we can distinguish between the truth-table for the sign, and the rules of inference that govern it. So for example, the classical elimination-rule for 'or' is: These rules define what I will call the 'pattern of use' for 'or'. They tell you how to confirm an 'or' statement, and they tell you the implications of an 'or' statement. These rules give a concise summary of the inputs to an 'or' judgement, and the outputs from an 'or' judgement. We shall see that we can give a parallel characterization of the pattern of use of a perceptual demonstrative.
A classical propositional constant, like 'or' makes a difference to the truthcondition of any statement containing it. A characterization of the 'semantic value' of the constant is a description of the contribution that the constant makes to the determination of a statement containing it as true or false. A classical propositional constant has a semantic value by being associated with a truth table. In the case of 'or', the classical truth table would of course be:
So we can make a distinction between the pattern of use of a propositional constant, which is described by the rules of inference for it, and the semantic value of the constant, which is supplied by its being associated with a truth table. I said that we will be able to describe the pattern of use of a demonstrative. We will also be able to contrast that pattern of use with the semantic value of the demonstrative, which is supplied by its being associated with an object as its referent.
On a classical view, the pattern of use for a propositional constant is justified by appealing to the truth-table for that constant. By appealing to the truth-table, you can see that the use of the introduction-rule for 'or' will indeed preserve truth from premises to conclusion. And indeed, you can see that this is the least demanding introduction rule that does guarantee the truth of the premises. Similarly, by appealing to the truth- table, you can see that the elimination-rule for 'or' preserves truth from premises to conclusion.
And you can see that it is the strongest elimination-rule to do so. If we suppose a speaker who knows the truth table for a propositional constant, we can say that this speaker knows what justifies the pattern of the use of the constant; this speaker knows the truth table that justifies the associated rules of inference.
This familiar case provides a model for our knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative. Just as we can characterize the introduction and elimination rules for a logical constant, so we can characterize the inputs and outputs of a perceptualdemonstrative judgment. Just as the constant has a semantic value by being associated with a truth table, the demonstrative has a semantic value by being associated with an object as its reference. Just as knowledge of the truth table justifies your use of the standard introduction and elimination rules for 'or', so too knowledge of the reference of a perceptual demonstrative justifies your making the pattern of use of it that you do.
Indeed, in one respect the classical model works better in the case of perceptual demonstratives than it does in the case of propositional constants. One reason that the classical propositional constants are easy to think about for us as theorists is that for them it is easy to give a concise characterization of the pattern of use that has to be justified. It is not so straightforward to describe the pattern of use of a perceptual demonstrative. How should we go about it? We have a clue from vision science. Much experimental work on vision goes like this. The subject is asked to make a verbal report, or to make some sign equivalent to a verbal report, involving a perceptual demonstrative. 'Push the button when you see that square turn red', for example. So a push on the button is equivalent to the judgment, 'that square is red'. Theorizing about the results of these experiments is typically an attempt to find the information-processing inputs to such a demonstrative judgment. So we can use the results of this approach to describe the basis on which we make use of a demonstrative, what the perceptual inputs are to the use of the demonstrative. This will provide us with a parallel to the introduction rule for a logical constant.
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In current vision science, the dominant approach to this question is work in Treisman's tradition, which supposes that the basis for a demonstrative verbal report of a perceived object, 'that is red', will include the content, 'Redness at place p', in which the feature redness is located on a feature map. So we could state the introduction rule for the demonstrative in some such terms as this:
FEATURE MAP: Redness at place p
JUDGMENT: That is red
This gives us the introduction rule for the demonstrative. We can take a similar approach to the output rules for a visual demonstrative. What is the output of a visual demonstrative judgment, such as 'That is red'? Actions are outputs from such judgments.
For example, if you want to pick up something red, then once you have formed the visual-demonstrative judgment, 'that is red', you are able to do it. So the judgment, 'that is red' is able to identify the object for the benefit of the motor system; and the evidence suggests that once again, location is critical (Jeannerod 1997 What changes the situation is the possibility of appealing to a relational conception of experience. On the relational conception, experience is a relation between the perceiver and a distal element of the environment, the object referred to. On the relational conception, the objects and properties about which we think demonstratively can constitute the qualitative characters of our experiences.
There could be different patterns of use associated with two demonstratives used to refer to the same object. In §3, I will set out Burge's Proximality Principle, and the problems he thinks it presents for a relational view of experience. Before doing so, though, I want to set out two background differences between us. In his essay, Tyler Burge says:
I accept that the way in which one is given the object (a way that marks the psychological state) plays a role in justifying, or warranting, the pattern of use made of the demonstrative. This much seems trivially true. The problem Wittgenstein is grappling with in his discussion of rule-following arises from the fact that he does not believe there is any justification at all to be given for the pattern of use that we make of a term. In particular, there are no notions of truth or reference in terms of which we can justify pattern of use; the ideas that the use of a propositional constant is justified by appeal to the truth table, or that the use of a singular term is justified by appeal to the reference of the term, are rejected. That means that he has a considerable problem in explaining how there can be such a thing as going right or wrong in one's use of a term; and that is what he is grappling with in his discussion of following a rule. Quine famously rejected the idea that the pattern of use of a term can be given any semantic justification; the structure of the waves that ripple across the field of force is not to be justified by appeal to the notions of truth and reference, but if justified at all, to be justified by the demands of science. Dummett, followed by Brandom, argued that there is a justification to be given for the pattern of use that we make of a term, but that the justification is not to be given in terms of truth and reference.
My own view is that we can appeal to the relational view of experience, and in particular, to the notion of being given an object in a particular way in experience, to claim to say that the experiential relation to the object is an element in the immediate justification of a belief involving the demonstrative. In fact, on the view I am advocating, the experiential relation to the object will not be an element in the immediate justification of a belief involving the demonstrative. Rather, the immediate justification of a belief involving the demonstrative will be provided by an information-processing content at the level of the feature-map, such as: 'Redness at place p'. Burge argues at some length that the immediate warrant for a perceptual-demonstrative belief must be provided by a state whose existence is independent of the existence of the external object referred to. In fact that is an implication of the view he is trying to criticize, for the information-processing state, 'Redness at place p', could perfectly well exist whether or not the external object exists.
The point is rather that the internal information-processing state could not have its status as part of the pattern of use of a demonstrative term unless the external object exists. Suppose you try to argue that you could justify the pattern of use of a demonstrative term without appealing to the existence of the external object referred to.
Here I think you generate the same kind of mystification that would be produced by arguing that the rules for inference of a classical propositional constant could be justified, even if there were no truth-table that could be produced for that constant which would justify those rules of inference. If the term is a classical propositional constant, then to assign it a semantic value is to assign it a truth table. Similarly, if a term is a visual demonstrative, then to assign it a semantic value is to assign it an object as reference.
And it is only once the semantic value of the term has been fixed that there is any particular pattern of use for it that can be justified by appeal to its semantic value.
On the relational view of experience, the object itself is a constituent of the visual experience. In perceiving the object, you do indeed experience it in a particular way; and the way in which that object is given plays a role in determining that one rather than another pattern of use for the term is correct. That is the point of the example I gave above, of the two different demonstratives referring to one and the same person.
It would be a mistake to suppose that we can somehow miss out the object altogether, leaving behind only the 'way' of thinking of that object, to justify a particular pattern of use. You might suppose, for example, that we could appeal to a conception of 13 perceptual experience on which the experience is exhausted by its representational content. That content will include, you may say, demonstratives. And can't the demonstratives that are elements in the content of experience themselves be anaphorically linked to the demonstratives one uses in propositional judgment? If so, isn't that all we require for a semantic justification of the pattern of use of the demonstrative?
The demonstrative contents that allegedly figure that there be such an object, and that you be appropriately related to it.
The Proximality Principle
Why do we need a relational view of experience? Only a relational view can acknowledge the role of experience in making it possible for us to think about the objects around us. It is, on the face of it, my current visual experience of the tree in front of me that makes it possible for me to think about it. But if you think of experience as, for example, a kind of sensation that the object produces in you, that makes it very difficult to understand why consciousness -the mere occurrence of a sensation -can have any role at all to play in your thought about the thing. Or if you think of experience as itself already a representational state, then the experiential state presupposes, and cannot explain, the ability to grasp those representations.
So far I have filled this out by remarking that knowledge of the reference of a term causes and justifies the pattern of use of the term; that in the case of a perceptual demonstrative, it is your experience of the object that causes and justifies the pattern of use that you make of the term; and that only experience, relationally conceived, can cause and justify the pattern of use that you make of a demonstrative.
Perceptual-demonstrative reference to objects depends on our perceiving them.
And this demands that we view perceptual experience as a relation between the perceiver and the things perceived. This relational view of experience says that the content of visual experience is constituted by the objects and properties in the scene perceived. This relational view is an analysis of ordinary perception. It provides no analysis of the separate phenomenon of hallucination.
Let us look, now, at Burge's objection to this relational view of experience. This relational view of experience says that the content of visual experience is not determined merely by proximal stimulation of the visual system. In his essay Burge says that vision science demands that we recognize only characterizations of perception that satisfy his 'Proximality Principle':
Holding constant the antecedent psychological set of the perceiver, a given type of proximal stimulation (over the whole body), together with associated internal afferent and efferent input into the perceptual system, will produce a given type of perceptual state, assuming that there is no malfunctioning in the system and no interference with the system. (Burge 2005, p. 22) Experience relationally conceived demands that the objects be there for you to see.
Holding constant the proximal stimulation is not enough for the objects to be there. So the relational conception of experience violates Proximality, since Proximality says that sameness of proximal stimulation (given the mentioned background conditions) is sufficient to guarantee sameness of perceptual state. Therefore, Burge says, the relational conception of experience has to be abandoned. For, Burge says, vision science depends on Proximality.
The trouble with this argument is that the ordinary notion of seeing also violates Proximality. So, by the lights of this argument, the ordinary distinction between seeing and hallucinating should also be abandoned. You might have thought that seeing and hallucinating were states of quite different perceptual types. But vision science has put paid to that. There is no distinction between seeing and hallucinating. And Burge does seem to draw this conclusion:
One of the most basic things we know from the science of vision is that the same perceptual type can be a perception, a misperception, or a perceptual illusion that fails to be a perception of anything in the environment. Here is another way in which to think of the issue. Russell thought our knowledge of truths has to be distinguished from our knowledge of things. In particular, the kind of knowledge of things that he calls acquaintaince does not consist in knowledge of truths at all:
Knowledge of things, when it is of the kind we call knowledge by acquaintance, is essentially simpler than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge of truths, though it would be rash to assume that human beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some truth about them.
( Russell 1912, p. 46.) And on Russell's view, our acquaintance with objects provides us with knowledge of the references of demonstrative terms, such as 'this' and 'that':
it is scarcely conceivable that we can make a judgement or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing about. We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere noise; and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted. (Russell 1912, p. 46.) This is a prototype of the relational view of experience: according to Russell, there is a kind of acquaintance with things that is not a matter of grasping some truth about them, and the content of the acquaintance is constituted by the object with which one is acquainted.
Suppose we liberalize Russell's official view, to allow that acquaintance can be a relation that holds between the perceiver and an ordinary distal object seen. Much of is. Joseph Levine argued that a full scientific account of perception would leave it unintelligible why one sensation -one color sensation, for example -rather than another is correlated with one neural state rather than another. These arguments have been much discussed and extremely popular. There has been something like a consensus that scientific accounts of perception do indeed leave certain questions about perceptual consciousness unaddressed.
The relational view of experience is intended to apply to the notion of perceptual experience. One way to see the appeal of the idea is to remark that problems about the qualitative nature of experience -problems of the sorts raised by Jackson and Levineapply most forcibly when we take it that the world experienced does not itself contain qualitative properties such as colors; when we take it that out in the world there are only the objects and properties described by basic physics. The puzzle then is how to locate the qualitative character of, for example, color experience. But this view of the world we observe is not compulsory. We could acknowledge that the world we observe can be correctly described at many different levels, not just the level of basic physics. The relational view depends on the idea that qualitative properties are in fact characteristics of the world we observe; our experiences have the qualitative characters that they do in virtue of the fact that they are relations to those aspects of the world. So looking for the qualitative character of experience in the nature of a brain state is looking for it in the wrong place; we have to be looking rather at the colors of the objects experienced.
Vision scientists are studying the brain. In effect, the methodology of cognitive science is to look for a box-and-arrow diagram of the structure of the visual system in the brain. The boxes and arrows are given their overall orientation by knowledge of the adaptive value of the visual system for the organism in its usual ecological niche. But the box-and-arrow diagram has also to be recognizable as a diagram of a particular set of biological structures in the brain. In the end, what this means is that that the box-andarrow breakdown of how every sub-task is accomplished by the system has to be ultimately involve processes that are achieved by 'primitive processors' such as variation in the rate of firing of a neuron (cf Block 1995 , Dennett 1981 . The whole methodology here is geared to providing an illuminating characterization of a brain system. Of course, there us no presumption that any particular assembly of cells is fulfilling just one function; a cell assembly may play many roles. The mission is to characterize those roles, for each cell assembly.
Classical computational approaches to vision propose that the functional architecture of the biological system can be characterized in terms of computations, realized by a biology with something like the syntax of a computational language. The methodology here was given its classic explicit formulation by Marr when he distinguished his three levels of analysis:
1. Computation 2. Algorithm
Implementation 22
At the level of computation we specify the task being performed by a visual system. At the level of the algorithm we specify the procedures that the system uses to perform that task. And at the level of implementation we say something about how in detail particular 'primitive processors' in the brain can be viewed as executing those procedures. Whether the full Proximality Principle is demanded by work in this tradition is a further question. You might think that something like Proximality is demanded because the aim is to characterize the workings of a brain system, and once we control for ecological niche the workings of the internal brain system are all that the vision scientist in this tradition is looking at. Still, to acknowledge that the vision scientist is describing the workings of a brain system is one thing, and to endorse Proximality is another. There is a certain determinism implicit in Proximality that the vision scientist need not endorse.
Let us look again at the Principle:
Holding constant the antecedent psychological set of the perceiver, a given type of proximal stimulation (over the whole body), together with associated internal afferent and efferent input into the perceptual system, will produce a given type of perceptual state, assuming that there is no malfunctioning in the system and no interference with the system. Proximality is moot. We need a notion of 'psychological set' that applies to any situation 24 whatever in which some kind of perceptual state might be produced. I don't know that we have any such notion, short of the 'total psychology' of the individual, whatever that is. 'Malfunctioning' is another notion that is worth a second look. Burge needs a notion of 'functioning properly' on which the visual system is functioning properly whether it yields perceptions of one's surroundings or mere hallucinations. Again, I don't know that we have a notion of proper functioning on which a visual system generating nothing but hallucinations is 'functioning properly'. And finally there is 'interference'. I suppose the idea is to acknowledge the possibility that something might come from outside the brain system itself and affect its behavior. The thing is that even with all these kludges jammed in, Proximality still might not work because the brain systems in question may be inherently noisy and their workings may be probabilistic rather than deterministic. Put in all the kludges, and put in the same proximal stimulation on two different occasions, and you might get different results just because the brain biology is inherently noisy and does not always work the same way, even though there are the statistical regularities that the vision scientist characterizes and on which human survival depends.
Of course, you might reformulate Proximality probabilistically, and say something like this: in an ordinary context, with nothing unusual going on, and all the kludges jammed in, sameness of proximal stimulus in that context is fairly highly correlated with sameness of conscious experience. The proponent of a relational view of experience could agree with this. In the good case, sameness of proximal stimulus in that context will be correlated with sameness of distal stimulus, after all.
These points are in a way irrelevant, though, because what is really driving
Burge's argument is not Proximality itself but the more fundamental point that the vision 25 scientists are aiming to characterize the visual system in the brain, and what goes on in the visual system in the brain is one thing and what goes on in the environment is another. The point that is often made, though, is that this classical cognitive science approach has no constitutive interest in problems of consciousness. A simple way to see the point is to reflect that Marr's approach could be and indeed has been fruitfully applied to give computational accounts of the human immune system. You might argue that the best way to view the immune system is as a computation system whose tasks include learning about and remembering pathogens, and which develops a battery of responses to them. The objective of a classical cognitive science approach to the immune system will be to give specification of the computational tasks performed by particular subsystems, explain what algorithms they use to perform them, and show how these algorithms are biologically implemented. Yet the immune system has no particularly direct connection with phenomena of consciousness. You might investigate the human visual system, using this same methodology, without it ever occurring to you that the human visual system has any particularly direct connection with phenomena of consciousness. That is really the point that Nagel and Jackson and Levine were making: that the phenomena of consciousness are not directly addressed by the scientific account of the visual system in the brain.
The relational view of experience, as I said, is an attempt to characterize phenomena of perceptual consciousness. The view is that the content of a perceptual experience is constituted by the objects and properties in the scene perceived.
Consequently, there is nothing in common between the experiential content of a perception when one ordinarily sees the scene before one, and the content of an 26 hallucination. It is, of course, consistent with this to acknowledge that there may be brain states shared by ordinary perceiving subjects and subjects in the grip of hallucination.
Vision scientists might characterize those states in the very same information-processing terms. But it does not follow from that there is no distinction to be drawn between those
states. There are important differences between ordinary perception and hallucination.
In a court of law, for example, life or death might turn on whether the witness really saw something or merely had a hallucination. The relational view of experience is attempting to characterize that difference between perception and hallucination in terms of the contents of the subject's conscious experience. You might indeed take a radical line here.
You might argue that the only distinctions we can legitimately draw between perceptual states are distinctions that conform to Proximality, such as distinctions between visual information-processing states in the brain. This would rule out the relational view of experience. It would also imply that there is no difference between perception and hallucination. Contemplating this strategy, I find myself with something of the emotions one might feel on watching the Charge of the Light Brigade. C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre.
Qualitative Aspects of Experience
One element in the appeal of Burge's Proximality Principle is that people often suppose that since the conscious aspects of experience are 'immediately given to the mind', there cannot be any mechanisms linking them to the mind. The line of thought is this:
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On the relational view the qualitative aspects of experience are constituted by the objects and properties around us. But vision science tells us that there are brain mechanisms involved in perception of those objects and properties. The end product of the operation of those brain mechanisms is to make the qualitative aspects of experience immediately present to the mind. If we assume, as does the Relational View, that the qualitative aspects of experience are not artifacts generated as the end points of brain processing, but are rather the distal stimuli to which the brain mechanisms link us, then we cannot acknowledge the immediacy with which the qualitative aspects of experience are given to the mind. That
immediacy cannot be reconciled with the Relationalist's idea that we are linked to the qualitative aspects of experience by means of brain mechanisms.
This we might call 'proximalism' about the mind. We think of the mind crouching in the center of the brain, receiving the input from brain processing which constitutes the qualitative content that is 'proximally' given to the mind. Everything else, including the distal objects and properties, will be given to the mind only 'mediately', in virtue of consciousness having this proximally determined qualitative content.
Dismantling this line of thought is an extensive exercise. We have to look quite critically at the sense, if any, in which the qualitative aspects of experience are 'immediately' given to the mind. And we have to articulate it fully enough to make it apparent that there is no conflict between anything that might be right in the idea, and the 28 point that brain mechanisms are what make available the qualitative aspects of experience.
I will not pursue the dismantling here. I will remark on why the dismantling is worth the effort. Letting go of the idea that the conscious life is in this sense a 'proximal' phenomenon is what makes it possible for us to recognize the role of consciousness in our cognitive lives. Once we think of consciousness as fundamentally a relation between the subject and the surroundings, we get how it is that thought about the surroundings could be made possible by consciousness of the surroundings. Articulating the role that consciousness, relationally conceived, plays in an understanding of demonstratives is just one piece in the resolution of this larger puzzle.
